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ABSTRACT
This article reflects on hybrid relationality as an analytical lens for
peacebuilding. It narrates the evolution of ‘the hybrid turn’ and
engages with common critiques of hybridity. It notes an
additional critique of hybridity’s implicit normativity. This article
agrees that relational approaches have much to offer hybrid
peacebuilding analysis and argues they could be strengthened
with complementation from a networked lens. The proposed
networked relational framework is animated with examples from
Sudanese peacebuilding following the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement in 2005. Overall, the article builds on critiques of







International peacebuilding is ‘a set of transitional activities to implement peace agree-
ments after civil wars’ which are implemented by entities external to the conflict
society (Sørbø 2004, iv). These international interventions coexist and contend with
national and local-level peacebuilding initiatives and other, locally-driven forms of
social, political and economic transformation. These activities are driven by competing
actors, each with different ideologies about what defines peace and how to build it.
Together, these various actors and ideologies constitute a multi-layered and fundamen-
tally ‘agonistic’ peacebuilding space (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, 764). Since the out-
comes of interactions between actors and ideologies determine the form of peace which
emerges in post-conflict contexts, analysing these interactions is an important step
towards understanding how to bring about sustainable forms of peace and avoid its
fragile and unjust iterations. Analytical frameworks should be adept at detecting which
interactions are productive and which are obstructive for sustainable peace because
they provide the first link in chains of investigations which eventually inform policy
actions. Flaws within frameworks could result in the misidentification of obstructive inter-
actions as productive and vice versa. In addition, a flawed framework could mean that
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some problematic interactions go undetected. These failings eventually manifest in
policy. It is therefore crucial that analytical frameworks perform well. To this end, this
article asks what analytical framework is appropriate to guide analysis of the ‘drama in
the site of social interactions’ between competing actors and ideologies during peace-
building (Ron 2009, 3).
The first third of the article reflects on hybridity and its emerging conceptual sup-
plement, relationality, as the dominant analytical lens for analysing peacebuilding
spaces from critical perspectives.1 It begins by narrating the evolution of the ‘hybrid
turn’ (Brown 2017; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016) and by demarcating descriptive, nor-
mative and analytical uses of hybridity. Narrowing its scope onto analytical hybridity,
the article highlights its contributions but shows how it remains a divisive framework
with many vocal critics (Brigg 2018; Hameiri and Jones 2018; Heathershaw 2013; Laffey
and Nadarajah 2012; Nadarajah and Rampton 2015; Zanker 2017). I show that even
after numerous reflections on hybridity, scholars are calling for peacebuilding analysis
to go ‘beyond hybridity’ (Hameiri and Jones 2018). Relational thinking has emerged as
its key supplementary concept (Brigg 2018; Hunt 2017; Joseph 2018).
In the middle third of the article, I argue that relational thinking can, to some extent,
counter the common critiques levelled at analytical hybridity but that an additional
concept is needed; namely, networks. Specifically, networked relationality can address
hybridity’s crypto-normativity. Here, I explain why crypto-normativity is a problem for
peace analysis and suggest why networked relationality is an appropriate remedy. By bor-
rowing conceptual andmethodological innovations from networked relationality (Castells
2011a; Crossley 2010; Mische 2011; White et al. 2007), the article presents a framework for
analysing interactions in peacebuilding which can extend hybrid relationality.
Finally, in the last third of the article, I draw on empirical examples from Sudan and
South Sudan in the wake of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in order to illustrate
the framework. This, the longest section of the paper, demonstrates how the analytical
framework can produce knowledge which, after subsequent steps of enquiry, can
inform policy actions in service of sustainable peace. Overall, it suggests how a hybrid
analysis of peacebuilding can be strengthened with networked relationality.
The rise and rise of hybrid approaches
Hybridity has various descriptive, normative and analytical applications which have been
outlined by Brown (2017), Dinnen and Kent (2015) and others (Millar 2014; Peterson
2012). Importantly, it is only the analytical application which concerns this article. An
outline of all three below should make clear which specific aspect of hybridity is relevant
to this argument.
Hybridity can be used descriptively to acknowledge the fundamental messiness of
peacebuilding. ‘Hybrid orders’ describe the outcomes of inevitable mixing between
various peacebuilding stakeholders: for example, Gacaca courts in Rwanda (Sriram
2012), state-formation in Timor Leste (Boege et al. 2008) and security-sector reform in
Afghanistan (Jarstad and Olsson 2012). In this descriptive use, both positive and negative
forms of hybridity can emerge from various negotiations, struggles and encounters (Rich-
mond 2015; Richmond 2019). Many studies draw on descriptive hybridity in combination
with other evaluative frameworks. Examples include investigations into legal pluralism
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(Forsyth 2017), or securitised gender relations (George and Kent 2017; McLeod 2015).
Here, descriptive hybridity serves as a metaphor which signals a background context of
general convolution. The plain fact of complexity during peacebuilding is not contested
in this article. Indeed, as put rather cheekily by Zaum (2012, 124), highlighting complexity
is nothing but a ‘statement of the obvious’.
Hybridity is also usednormatively to promote the agencyof local actors and ideologies in
the face of the international. In this usage of hybridity, there is an explicit postulation -
backed by evidence from interventions such as those made in Iraq and Afghanistan in
the 2000s - that international peacebuilding is ultimately harmful and shouldbe hybridised,
meaning toned-down, with local agency. Scholars writing from this position produce pre-
scriptive research recommending pathways towards local empowerment against inter-
national interveners (Richmond and Mitchell 2011; Visoka and Richmond 2017).2
Normative applications of hybridity in peace research, in which the imperialism of inter-
national peacebuilders has been firmly established from the outset, are not contested here.
Finally, and what concerns this article, are the analytical applications of hybridity.
Hybridity provides a diagnostic framework for analysing how interactions between
different actors and ideologies function or disfunction. In this application, hybridity is
‘not something to be achieved, nor does it describe a good or bad state of affairs in
itself. In this sense it is not prescriptive’ (Brown 2017, 453). Instead, it serves as a ‘heuristic
device’ (Forsyth 2017) to illuminate a range of problematic and/or productive sites of
exchange. Knowledge of such interactions forms one of the primary steps in chains of
investigations which end with policies which support sustainable peace. Such policies
can be implemented by a range of actors including national governments, regional auth-
orities, third sector organisations and international peacebuilders. In this sense, analytical
hybridity provides the necessary epistemological material for subsequent normative
questioning which, in turn, informs action on the ground. Its two main analytical appli-
cations are outlined below.
Hybridity within the international and the local
Hybrid analyses have gone beyond the habitual conflation of international with liberal
identities and local with non-liberal identities found in the mission civilisatrice critique
of international peacebuilding (Paris 2002). Taken in concert with investigations into
local adaptability (de Coning 2018) and resilience (Chandler 2012), hybrid analyses
have unpacked local agency to demonstrate that the local is highly agential, stratified
and diverse (Kappler 2014; Mac Ginty 2011). Hybrid analyses have also nuanced the inter-
national: see for example, Lundqvist and Öjendal’s (2018) comparative study of interven-
tions in Nepal and Cambodia, and Boege and Rinck’s (2019) study of state-formation in
Bougainville. In both studies, the international does not impress ideological liberalism
on peacebuilding but performs a more technocratic and supportive role. Furthermore,
hybrid analyses have demonstrated that a spectrum of co-operation and conflict exists
between locals and internationals which includes local acceptance of the international
and vice versa (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016, 221). Tensions occurring between interna-
tionals and locals are not all-encompassing but occur at specific ‘frictional sites’ (Schia
and Karlsrud 2013, 233) for example, across different ‘institutional, practical, ritual and
conceptual’ spheres (Millar 2014, 501).
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While hybrid analyses have addressed the habitual conflation of liberal-international
and non-liberal local identities, they still draw criticism from those claiming that the inter-
national is ‘monolithically’ liberal (Laffey and Nadarajah 2012, 407). Critics claim that
interest in the liberal international pervades hybrid analyses to the extent that it is not
clear which aspects of the international are the source of friction except in relation to lib-
eralism (Heathershaw 2013, 279–280; Lee 2015; Sabaratnam 2013, 267). Hameiri and
Jones (2018, 56) state that ‘despite recent efforts at nuance, hybridity ultimately dichot-
omises and reifies local-traditional and international-liberal ideal-type assemblages’.
While it may be more complicated than that - and the above examples show that
hybrid analyses do not unconsciously merge international and liberal identities - a
general interest in ‘the international as liberal’ is still detectable in the literature,
overall (Hunt 2017). This is not necessarily a problem for any individual study but the
general focal point is increasingly harder to justify in light of recent international policy
trends to adopt new ‘policy frameworks which move beyond, or unsettle, the liberal
peace model’ (Moe and Stepputat 2018, 294). This is also important given the rise of
international peace actors who self-identify as ‘non-liberal’ such as China (Paffenholz
2015, 863).
Hybridity beyond the international and the local
In its second analytical application, hybridity is applied to analyse interactions beyond
international and local exchanges. It examines ‘the complex linkages, relationships and
frictions that exist between local, national, and transnational institutions, actors and dis-
courses’ (Forsyth et al. 2017, 413). Proponents argue that hybridity draws attention to the
‘constant process of negotiation’ where ‘multiple sources of power in a society compete,
coalesce, seep into each other, engage in mimicry, domination and accommodation’ (Mac
Ginty and Richmond 2016, 220). It urges ‘a focus on where power lies within systems, who
exercises power and how’ (Jackson and Albrecht 2018, 41,43) and is adept to illuminate
the ‘spatialised political economic struggles and processes that play out across local, pro-
vincial, national, and transnational scales’ (Allen and Dinnen 2017, 500).
To this end, several empirical studies have examined hybridity beyond the mixing of
the international and the local. For example, Smith (2014) has shown how national gov-
ernments in Indonesia have led a project of hybrid state formation. Popplewell (2019) has
observed that ‘the global’ in peacebuilding can be brought via different avenues other
than via international peacebuilders. Therefore, global-local hybridity can exist indepen-
dently of the so-called importers of peace. In addition, several studies combine hybridity
with other evaluative frameworks of power dynamics such as feminism. For example,
McLeod’s (2015) careful gendering of hybrid peacebuilding examines power dynamics
at the intersections of masculinities and femininities. See also Martin de Almagro’s fem-
inist discussion of gendered ‘hybrid clubs’ (2018) and McLeod and O’Reilly’s Special Issue
on feminism in Peacebuilding (2019).
Notwithstanding these contributions, the analytical hybridity literature still draws criti-
cism for tending to ‘focus primarily on the interface between the international and the
local’ (Hunt 2018, 56). Paffenholz (2015, 863) determines that the focus on the inter-
national-local relationship in hybridity scholarship is ‘excessive’. Many studies acknowl-
edge the international and local are only one pair among a range of relevant actors
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but express specific interest in focusing on that site of exchange (See Jackson and
Albrecht 2018, 39). Again, this not a problem for any one particular study – each
author can choose their own preferred focal point within a complex schema. However,
when taken together as an entire literature, hybridity scholarship is consistently
rebuked for its preoccupation with international-local interactions.
From hybridity to relationality
The pro-hybridity crowd may disagree with the characterisation put by their critics, but
the fact remains that, in general and overall, hybrid analysis has a reputation for a)
focusing on the liberal aspects of the international and b) focusing on local-inter-
national interactions. As a result, there is somewhat of an impasse within peace
studies between those in favour and those against hybrid analysis. As noted by
Hunt (2017, 211), some are content with this us-them stand-off, but others strive for
synthesis. In seeking to make conceptual manoeuvres which will transform hybridity
into something more universally acceptable, several scholars have called for an apprai-
sal of the foundational concept upon which hybrid peace analysis is based; hybridity as
critical theory.3
The incorporation of hybridity into the social sciences was originally developed as a
way of understanding and analysing cultural interactions between colonial and post-colo-
nial subjects (Bhabha 1994; Pieterse 1994; R. J. Young 1994). Bhabha (1994) argued that in
the context of interventions, a ‘third space’ is produced when two (normally antagonistic)
entities meet to negotiate a third common position. Several postcolonial scholars (Gilroy
2013; Hall 1996; Hutnyk 2005) have critiqued this position because it presumes ‘two
anterior purities’ (Gilroy 1994, 54–55) prior to their mixing. Therefore, hybridity – as a
foundational concept – can be seen to promote an ‘essentialising’ approach to identities
(Bargués-Pedreny and Mathieu 2018; Brigg 2018; Joseph 2018; Martin de Almagro 2018).
Brigg (2018, 353) has argued this foundation could subtly steer analysis of difference
towards ‘identitarian’ logics whereby cultures which have the potential to clash are
viewed in terms of their ‘thingness’ and are seen as somewhat fixed. It is certainly
logical to see how this foundational concept might direct an analyst towards essentialis-
ing the international as liberal.
Furthermore, it has been noted that the concept of hybridity, at its foundational core,
and before its introduction into peace studies, is predisposed to focus on dyadic inter-
actions. While hybridity ‘avoids the politics of polarity’ (Pile 1994, 255) by showing the
emergence of the third space between two ideal poles, the poles themselves are never-
theless essential for a hybrid analysis. In other words, in hybridity as critical theory, poles
are not only reified but also preordained as the units of analysis. It is logical to see how this
foundational concept might promote the analysis of peace interactions in dyadic modes
i.e. to focus on the interaction between A and B rather than between, for example, A,B,C
and D or to ask what is the impact of A, B and C’s activities on D, E and F. This explains why
Zanker (2017, 180–181) suggests that ‘though the hybridity literature [in peace studies]
recognises the multiple agents involved in a process of implementation, it usually does
not allow for more than two actors or their internal heterogeneity’. Thus, it is logical to
see how such a conceptual background might promote a focus on polarised inter-
national-local interactions.
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Certainly, the essentialising and polarising tendencies do not find expression in all
analysis written from within the hybrid school in peace studies. There is no path depen-
dency at work here; more of a subtle - and perfectly resistible - nudging. Numerous excep-
tions have been highlighted in both sections above (Jackson and Albrecht 2018; Millar
2016). Indeed, the purpose of these ventures into hybridity’s deep theoretical back-
ground was not to find root causes of poor analysis, and thus concede the point.
Rather, they were made by pro-hybridity scholars in the interests of guarding against
the enduring critiques which have earned hybrid peace analysis its (fair or unfair) repu-
tation. In that sense it has been productive; investigations into hybridity – as a founda-
tional concept - have illuminated the specific areas where the underlying theory of
peace analysis could be bolstered. Seeking a supplementary theory which is explicitly
de-essentialising and de-polarising, several scholars have identified relationality4 as an
appropriate concept (Hameiri and Jones 2015; Hunt 2017; Hunt 2018).
In countering hybridity’s essentialising tendency, Brigg (2013, 87) demonstrates that
relational thinking is fundamentally de-essentialising owing to its basis in a social ontol-
ogy in which society is viewed ‘not as a space “containing” relations, nor an arena where
relations are played out. It is rather the very tissue of relations (society “is relation” and
does not “have relations”)’. Steered by this foundational concept, several relational
studies have taken a de-essentialising view of identities in peacebuilding contexts. For
example, Martin de Almagro (2018) has shown, using feminist conceptualisations of per-
formativity, how ‘the local’ and ‘the international’ are non-essential identities which the
same actor can occupy (or conjure) in different relational spaces. Accruing knowledge
about the fluid and changing nature of contestation between relational – and not fixed
– identities can inform targeted policy support for secure social relations. This is has
been shown in Brigg’s (2018) example of restorative justice in Aboriginal Australia.
Further, in countering the polarising tendency, Hunt (2018, 65) has suggested that a
relational approach could be invoked to augment hybrid thinking by ‘opening up
engagement with the whole system’. He shows how relational approaches can be used
to analyse relationships among a ‘constellation of providers [of security]’ including
local governments, regional chiefs, vigilante mobs, and international peacebuilders. In
a similar vein, Hameiri and Jones (2018) have applied a scalar lens to analyse relationships
at various cross-cutting tiers of political authority. In line with these studies, it is important
to show which constellations of relationships are ‘predatory, parasitic or mutual’ (Hunt
2017, 219–221) and to locate them at ‘intra and inter-scalar sites of socio-political con-
testation’ (Hameiri and Jones 2018, 74). Upon the basis of those findings and following
additional questioning, it is then possible to arrive at a better understanding of where
key actors can be supported to shape and transform their relationships in ways that
lead to enhanced security (Hunt 2017, 225).
Hybrid analysis as implicitly normative
Relational thinking has clearly contributed to the honing of hybrid peace analysis. Yet, the
normativity of hybridity, as a foundational concept, also leaves the analytical framework it
informs open to persistent critiques. Hybridity, as a critical theory, and before its introduc-
tion into peace studies, is designed to expose the ambivalent effects of colonisation in
such a way that promotes the agency of the intervened upon in relation to the
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intervening power. As is well-known, hybridity was introduced into peace studies as part
of attempts to side-step the short-comings of the mission civilisatrice critique of inter-
national peacebuilding (Paris 2002), while at the same time retaining a postcolonial cri-
tique of peace interventions. Proponents argue that hybridity can ‘reveal, or even
provide, a politics of liberation for subaltern constituencies’ (Nadarajah and Rampton
2015, 8). As argued at the start of this article, it is recommended in explicitly normative
hybrid studies that processes of hybridisation ought to be encouraged in peacebuilding
in order to alleviate the ill-effects of liberal imperialism rolled out during blue-print inter-
ventions. This decolonial application of hybridity is to be applauded when done openly in
this normative tradition to produce explicitly prescriptive research.5 However, a problem
arises when this normative promulgation of hybridity is unconsciously subsumed within
its analytical applications. In other words, when its analytical function is crypto-normative.
For some proponents of hybridity, this normative function is presented as combining
well with its analytical utility as a heuristic device. Hybridity has been endorsed for its
aptness to understand patterns of interaction during peacebuilding; it is described as a
‘framework in which power circulates between its constituent actors, who are involved
in a range of discussions of how conflict can be resolved or transformed at its related
local, elite and state, regional, and international levels’ (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016,
229). Yet, much of this analytical prowess comes with implicit endorsements: ‘this book
recommends the concepts of hybridity and hybridisation as a way of overcoming hege-
monic narratives of conflict and internationally supported peace interventions’ (Mac Ginty
2011, 2). Bernhard (2013, 14) presents hybridity’s utility ‘not merely as a mixture of
different ideas and approaches of how to build peace, but as a tool to resist dominant
peacebuilding approaches’. In this sense, many of those promoting hybridity as an
analytical tool for understanding multiple interactions and their effects on peacebuilding
are doing so from a morally anti-imperialist positionality and with a normative emancipa-
tory agenda.
I accept the arguments of post-positivists that all analysis is, to some extent, driving
towards normative aims.6 However, analytical and normative studies are nevertheless
different lines of scientific enquiry and require different modes of questioning: analytical
questions seek to know what is the case and normative questions seek to know what
should be the case. Normative and analytical enquiries, while always interrelated and
engaged in iterative exchange, should be epistemologically sequenced, rather than sim-
ultaneous. In addition, clarity about which line of enquiry is being followed is necessary
for coherent and productive debate. I suggest that it is the cloudy combination of norma-
tive and analytical lines of enquiry that is partly responsible for the enduring critiques of
hybrid peace analysis. This crypto-normativity could also contribute to confusion between
those in favour and those against hybrid analysis. To put it crudely, an analytical question
(what is the case?) such as ‘What power relations have impeded sustainable peace in, for
example, Sierra Leone?’ cannot coherently be addressed with a normatively anti-imperi-
alist framework because the analytical enquiry will be on course to discover colonial forms
of problematic power relations and, in the process, overlook others.
While successfully promoting the contestation of colonial hegemony when it has
occurred, it is precisely this prior normative agenda which impinges on the ability for
hybridity to be used as an analytical tool to understand all forms of ideological and/or
actor exchanges during peace interventions. While numerous axes of resistance and
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domination exist between and among the local as well as between and among the inter-
national, hybridity á la Bhabha could subtly direct analysis away from these patterns of
interaction since it is conceptually predisposed to finding the West as the imperialising
force. This explains the entrapment experienced when hybridity’s analytical purpose is
combined with its postcolonial ethical stance. If the need to ‘move beyond inter-
national/local power dynamics’ and be ‘attentive to the pluralities of power and practice’
(Mitchell 2011, 1623) is to be met, a further conceptual move is called for.
Towards a networked approach to relational analysis
The above critiques specifically call for an analytical supplement for hybridity which a)
counteracts a tendency to essentialise and polarise and b) is equipped to identify relations
of oppression and domination but which is not predisposed to finding them at any par-
ticular axis of identities. I argue that networked relationality is a logical framework for this
task. First, in concert with Hunt’s (2017; 2018) calls for seeing whole systems, networked
relationality specifically guides analysis beyond ‘multiple duets’ (Wellman 1997, 20) and
towards the comprehension of a ‘broader structure’ (Crossley 2010, 40). Second, in
concert with Brigg (2018) and Hameiri and Jones (2018), networked relationality concep-
tualises the structure of interactions as existing within a historically constituted and pol-
itically uneven social reality in which relations – not entities or identities – are
ontologically primary. It is therefore adept to expose all manner of productive or proble-
matic relations between actors and ideologies within a non-essentialising frame. As such,
a networked relational approach is equipped to detect unequal relations of a colonial
nature but is not predisposed to finding them and overlooking others. Importantly, this
analytical frame, in turn, provides the material for subsequent but not parallel normative
arguments and investigations. A normative investigation (asking what should be done
about xyz unequal relations to promote sustainable peace) could follow on from the
below proposed analytical process whose role is to establish the existence of xyz
unequal power relations in the first place.
Networks as conceptual supplement
Networks have become particularly visible in sociological enquiry in light of impressive
innovations in actor-network theory, global production networks, social network analysis
and transnationalism. While network theory and networked relationality are related and
mutually relevant fields, this article does not engage with network theory per se. While
theories of networked relationality do borrow terminology from pure network theory,
they have nevertheless arisen out of sociological enquiries within relational social ontol-
ogy and not within the positivist tradition of network analysis (Borgatti et al. 2009; Bor-
gatti, Brass, and Halgin 2014; Knox, Savage, and Harvey 2006). To understand the role
of ‘the network’ in this framework, it is important to recognise its roots in the literature
on ontological relationality rather than deriving from the positivist tradition of pure
network analysis.
The network motif has been adopted by relational scholars such as Mische (2011),
Emirbayer (1997) and Castells (2004; 2011a) in order to identify a range of multi-direc-
tional interactions. For networked relational analysts, network principles are used in a
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theoretical, as well as a methodological sense (Mische 2011, 80) to formalise the analysis
of dynamic encounters as an interwoven ‘set of institutions, knowledge, practices, and
artefacts thereof’ (Riles 2001, 3). Networked principles are applied to make analytically
managable interdependent systems of material, social and political relations during ‘all
forms of exchange’ (Castells 2007, 27). As such, networked approaches to relationality
have been guided by the ‘anti-categorical imperative’ (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994,
1414) 7 which underpins a conceptual commitment to viewing the links between non-
essential entities in a ‘broader structure’ (Crossley 2010, 40).
Networked relationality has been applied to analyses of transnational activism
(Keck and Sikkink 1998), global social movements (Diani and McAdam 2003), and min-
ority advocacy campaigns (Riles 2001). These social phenomena share two key aspects
with peacebuilding: a) they are goal-oriented projects in which the goals may be
differently defined by the various actors involved b) they often, but not necessarily,
combine a range of global and local actors who do not participate in isolated
duets but as constituents in webs of cross-cutting exchanges. It is these conceptual
insights and their analytical applications which make them appropriate for borrowing
into an analysis of peacebuilding. The below framework is developed from a combi-
nation of various networked relational analyses and is tailored to peacebuilding
analysis.
Networked relationality in peacebuilding analysis
The most important contribution of networked relationality is the epistemological and
methodological separation of actors and ideologies as suggested by Riles (2001). This
chimes with observations made in the hybrid peace literature of differences between
‘conceptual hybridity and behavioural hybridity’ (Millar 2014) and ‘spaces of interplay’
at agential, ideational and processural spheres (Belloni 2012, 24). Where in a hybrid
analysis, these various spaces of interplay are analysed at once, a networked analysis
provides for their analytical distinction. To be specific, networked relationality makes
clear the distinctions between ‘points and flows’, which make up the agential entities
within a social system and the ideologies circulating between them. Applying net-
worked relationality to peacebuilding allows for the conceptualisation of peacebuild-
ing actors as points – for which there is one method of analysis – and the
ideologies circulating in between them as the flows – for which there is a related
but separate method of analysis. Importantly, the analytical separation of actors and
ideologies does not entail a rejection of their interdependence. Instead, they are
seen as ‘inherently recursive’ (Riles 2001) and provision is made for this,
methodologically.
The second contribution is that any discussion of actors and ideologies includes a
focus on the location and patterns of circulation of their characteristics within the
broader network structure. This locative element fits well with Hunt’s (2017; 2018) rela-
tional turn and also Hameiri and Jones (2018) and Allen and Dinnen (2017) work on
scalar analysis. As Diani and McAdam (2003, 4,7) explain ‘referring to networks pro-
vides a clue to assess the social location of specific actors as well as to identify
general structural patterns […] The identification of points, of the relevant flows
between them, and of the boundaries of the network represent fundamental steps
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in any study of network structures’. The establishment of the situated and circulatory
nature of actors and ideologies renders meaningless claims that some actors or ideol-
ogies are, for example, ‘dominant’ or ‘legitimate’. Instead, their dominance or legiti-
macy will be specified with reference to their situatedness and circulatory patterns
throughout the network structure.
The third contribution of a networked relational approach is to pay attention to net-
worked hinterlands. As well as looking inside the network of peacebuilding actors and
ideologies, it is also important to look outside of it to broader and prior networks.
Using the methodology of networked relationality, it becomes clear that these actors
and ideologies which comprise the peacebuilding network, are structured by and
mediated by broader exchanges of ‘macronetworks’ of norms, institutions, ideas and
value systems (Castells 2011b). It is important to establish whether problematic or pro-
ductive networked relations are explicable through exchanges made during peacebuild-
ing or during broader and prior networked encounters. Accruing knowledge in the above
three domains will provide a detailed picture of which imbalances between actors and
ideologies are conflict-promoting or peace-promoting and where specifically they are
located in the relational system. In turn, this epistemic material will inform subsequent
normative questioning about how the uncovered imbalances should be addressed, and
by whom, in service of building sustainable peace.
Networked relationality in Sudanese peacebuilding
The framework is animated with empirical examples from Sudanese peacebuilding follow-
ing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Due to space limitations, it is not
possible to conduct a full case study nor an exhaustive and original analysis of Sudanese
peace. Instead, the empirical aspects illustrate what kinds of questions the proposed frame-
work is equipped to answer and how. The Sudanese case is productive for this task because
the CPA was a landmark peace agreement heralded as ending ‘Africa’s longest civil war’
(Korybko 2018) between centres of power in Khartoum and Juba. It provided for a referen-
dum on the secession of the South and, in 2011, delivered two new states whose paths
towards peace included several supra-national, international, national, regional and com-
munity-level efforts. To be clear, the CPA has been technically successful because wide-
spread conflict between North and South Sudan has not re-emerged. However, in the
decade following its signing, neither state has achieved sustainable peace: both continue
to grapple with severe domestic conflicts with annual loss of life at least as bad as in
peak of the civil war (ACLED 2015; Villiers 2015). South Sudan (formerly southern Sudan)
entered civil war in 2013 and has since been dubbed the ‘world’s most failed state’ (Sen
2015). Meanwhile, the government in the Republic of Sudan (formerly north Sudan) has
continued to fight multiple insurgencies in its peripheries and, in 2019, faced a popular
uprising which toppled the semi-authoritarian regime which had reigned for thirty years.
In 2020, both states are facing a precarious future. Investigating the ‘drama at the site of
social interactions’ (Ron 2009, 3) which can explain the sustained conflict following the
CPA will be important for informing policy-oriented enquiries about what can be done
to promote sustainable peace in both states. While only fragments of a full case study
are shown below, the empirical material serves to ground, animate and colour this expo-
sition of a networked relational analysis.
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Actors as points
Firstly, actors – the points – are denoted in networked relational analysis not as individuals
but as groups or clusters who share a collective identity at a meso level of specificity. In a
networked relational analysis, the ‘international’ and the ‘local’ are too macro to be con-
sidered coherent collective identities. Instead, specific INGOs, states, national govern-
ments, political parties and factions within them, community-based organisations,
corporations, self-defining shared interest groups are internally coherent networked
actors. It is important to establish whether the relations between actors are cooperative,
uncooperative, dissenting, resisting, equal or unequal. This chimes with suggestions to
consider relationships which coalesce, contend, and co-opt (Mac Ginty and Richmond
2016) but, crucially, networked relationality guides analysis towards the relations
between the whole system of points and not only between macro dyads such as the
local and international. Analysing relations between all relevant peacebuilding actors
also helps to reveal that, while one actor may be labelled, for example, ‘contentious’ in
one networked relation, they do not necessarily carry this identity throughout the
whole structure of peacebuilding interactions. Furthermore, their contentiousness rises
and falls during different activities and temporalities.
To illustrate, a relational analysis of actors in Sudan would begin with questions such as
‘what relations between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) (the main pol-
itical and armed group representing South Sudan) and other peacebuilding actors during
the CPA have led towards the eruption of conflict in South Sudan?.’ Here, a hypothetical
hybrid relational analysis might be drawn towards analysing the relationship between the
SPLM and the international mediators and sponsors. It might conclude that the inter-
national Troika - the USA, UK and Norway - dominated the SPLM to the extent that
their overbearing influence set the South on a path towards a statebuilding project
which was not sufficiently locally legitimated.
While the imposition of the international community is not irrelevant (Rolandsen 2011,
561; J. Young 2005), it is also only one aspect of a full picture and to present it alone could
lead to misdirected policy interventions. A networked relational analysis of actor inter-
actions would go beyond this to provide a picture of the broader structure of relations cir-
culating around the SPLM. It would divide the SPLM itself into different actor groups and
inquire about their legitimacy – not as a fixed characteristic – but as it appears between
other relevant actors in the wider network and as it circulates under different conditions.
While negotiating with Khartoum as a single entity, the SPLM was a fragile coalition of
different armed and political factions brought together through conquest (Brosché and
Duursma 2018). It won broad support among Southern Sudanese, eventually, and after
departing with a plan for a unified ‘New Sudan’, on an anti-North secessionist agenda
(Rolandsen 2011, 562). The SPLM therefore achieved legitimacy among the overall South
Sudanese population when it came to negotiating with Khartoum and to representing
the South in the transitional government. However, upon independence, the SPLM had
not garnered the broad base of legitimacy nor fostered the ‘resilient social contract’
required to lead a statebuilding project (Kuol 2020). Indeed, the SPLM split into its prior fac-
tions along ethno-political lines shortly after independence (Ylönen 2016, 221).
A networked relational analysis of actors urges one not to ask whether the SPLM has
sufficient legitimacy to maintain peace but to delve deeper and range wider: to ask what
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factions within the SPLM had legitimacy among which other peacebuilding actors and to
do what, exactly. Crucially, a networked relational analysis would ask where specifically in
the network of actors is the SPLM legitimate and where is it illegitimate; under what cir-
cumstances does its legitimacy ebb or flow? Knowing this provides important material to
ask subsequent normative questions about policy actions such as ‘How can communities
in South Sudan be supported to hold their government to account?.’ If a hybrid analysis
exposes a deficiency in legitimacy between the state and the society, networked thinking
shows this is not due alone, or even significantly, because of the involvement of the
Western Troika. It demonstrates the specific locations in the network where legitimacy
is lacking. In doing so, it suggests where subsequent normative questions could be
directed.
Ideologies as flows
Ideologies should be analysed as flows between actors, as opposed to being conflated
with the actors themselves. A networked relational approach specifically discourages
the notion of, for example, ‘liberal peace actors’. Instead, actors constitute ‘points’ and
ideologies constitute the ‘flows’ between those points. Mische (2011, 9) has demon-
strated that one of the ways in which relational scholars have made use of networked
ideologies is through seeing them as ‘pipelines of social influence, in the form of atti-
tudes, ideas and innovations’. Just as Brigg (2018), Hunt (2018) and Martin de Almagro
(2018) promote the analysis of de-essentialised identities, networked relationality does
the same for ideologies. Maintaining a networked relationality ensures that peacebuilding
ideologies, for example, liberalism, secularisation, or Islamism are not essentialised as part
of actor identities such as the international, the local, or the state. This perspective enables
the analysis of how peacebuilding ideologies circulate among points, sometimes clashing
with one another, sometimes coalescing, sometimes compromising. It is not meaningful
in a networked relational analysis to name one ideology dominant full stop, but its dom-
inance must be located at specific relational sites and its fluidity must be traced through-
out the network structure.
To illustrate using the Sudanese case, a relational analysis of ideologies in Sudanese
peacebuilding might begin with a question ‘How do the relations between peacebuild-
ing ideologies during the CPA explain the emergence of conflict in the Republic of
Sudan?.’ A hypothetical hybrid relational analysis might be drawn to analyse the
liberal ideologies of the World Bank and the British and American states as they
vied for dominance with the Islamism of the Government of Sudan (GoS). It might con-
clude that the combination of liberal and Islamic ideologies that emerged from the
CPA negotiations produced a state ripe for conflict. It was indeed the Troika of USA,
Norway and UK who insisted on holding multi-party democratic elections in the
North in the interim period before the Southern referendum (H. F. Johnson 2011,
136). This motivated the GoS to entrench its Islamist agenda to appease the numerous
Arab dissidents it needed to maintain power. In turn, this gave peripheral rebel groups
renewed grievance and incentivised them to renege from their commitments to peace
talks (Natsios 2012, 155–161). Therefore, Islamism, combined with premature demo-
cratic events, can be seen to have created a bedrock for prolonged domestic
conflict in the post-secession north.
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While not without evidence, the above analysis is somewhat limited. A networked
relational approach would guard against approaching the question from an essentia-
lising position in which the GoS is defined as Islamist and ‘the international’ as liberal.
A networked relational approach would instead ask where in the broader network of
actors are different peacebuilding ideologies dominant? It would ask how does this
variegated and fluid pattern of dominance pave the way for conflict? Aside from
the fact that the numerous international actors did not have a unified ‘liberal’ pos-
ition (Srinivasan 2014), a networked relational approach would reveal that there
were elements of Islamism, socialism and liberalism in the GoS position outside of
the influence of the international community. Each of these different ideologies
appear in different areas of the broader peacebuilding network in patterns which
are conflict-promoting.
To be clear, the Islamism pursued by the GoS was pragmatic in the context of national
elections and did contribute to peripheral grievance. However, this ideological patronage
had been part of Khartoumian strategy for decades (El Battahani 2006, 13). In addition to
this, the GoS did not fully liberalise Sudanese markets – indeed, international sanctions
prevented full insertion into global economies – but instead implemented a deep natio-
nalisation of land and private business. Following the precedent set by Nimeiri, President
Bashir gifted the military vast quantities of national assets thus creating a pseudo-private
sector which was controlled by his armies (De Waal 2017). These activities resulted in a
national economy which has elements of laissez faire, socialism and Islamism (Hussien
and Dibie 2017). The ensuing network of patronage and the suppression of middle
class social mobility can be seen as preconditions for the prolonged peripheral grievance
which eventually incorporated the urban centre and culminated in the uprising against
the GoS in 2019.
Furthermore, a networked relational analysis of peacebuilding ideologies would also
direct attention towards the ideological underpinnings of the peripheral combatants
and communities. Following the CPA, violence in northern Sudanese peripheral areas
– most notoriously Darfur, but also The Three Areas and East Sudan – deteriorated
drastically. An analysis of ideological relationality from a networked perspective
reveals the ideological clashes taking place outside of international influence. In
search of a peace dividend, the GoS sold land to investors for large agricultural pro-
jects resulting in the displacement of previously settled tribes. These newly mobile
communities then entered competition for land in areas in which conflict had been
ongoing for decades between settled tribes and so-called Arab nomads (Ayoub
2006, 15). This spurred a three-way ideological clash. Specifically, newly displaced
tribes argued their rights to land emerged from their status as modern Sudanese citi-
zens and tax-payers, while settled pastoralists appealed to customary law and Arab
nomads drew on Islamic doctrine stating that all land belongs to Allah (Ayoub 2006,
15–16). This shifting narrative further intertwined tribal disputes into the govern-
ment-periphery conflict and frustrated the community resolution mechanisms
equipped to manage conflicts of such a nature.
Thus, a networked approach to ideological relationality urges a more comprehensive
answer to questions about the ideological underpinnings of conflict when compared
with a relational analysis informed only by hybridity. It is not the case that the ‘liberal
international’ hybridises with an ‘Islamist state’ or a ‘customary local’ but rather
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liberal, socialist, Islamic, and customary ideologies originate at various locations and cir-
culate throughout the network of peace actors. Networked thinking shows how the pat-
terns of these circulatory ideologies have thwarted peace in myriad ways. When informing
policy interventions which aim to make peace in Sudan sustainable, it is important to
know exactly where in the network these ideologies are clashing. For example, a
hybrid analysis might highlight the need for policies which smooth over the intrusion
of religion into democratic politics but a networked approach shows these policies
would not only need to be directed at national electoral events. They would also need
to take into account debates within communities about their own forms of authority
and security.
Inherent recursivity
In seeking to understand why a network structure exists in the ways it does, it is important
to comprehend the various ways in which that network is self-produced. Riles (2001, 4)
has offered a ubiquitously appropriate yet somewhat vague command to ‘see the
network twice’ both ‘inside and out’. I have taken this as a call to always bear in mind
the iteratively creative relationship between any given component of the network, and
the network in its entirety. In this way, networks must be seen twice, both from the
inside, as they affect their components, and from the outside, as they are affected by
their components.
Importantly for networked relationality, the points (actors) and flows (ideologies) are in
relationships of reciprocity and interdependence. As Mische (2011, 17) argues, networks
are ‘mutually generative’ of the interactions which compose them or, as put by Riles
(2001, 172), networks have an ‘an inherent recursivity’. There must be an appreciation
of how the flows or points in question are simultaneously produced by, and creative
of, the other relations of points and flows in which they are embedded. In other words,
the analytical separation of actors into points and ideologies into flows does not entail
a dismissal of their relatedness. To expand on the empirical examples above: a full under-
standing of the networked legitimacy of the SPLM among Southern Sudanese cannot be
achieved without acknowledgement of its ideological shift from a unified secular ‘New
Sudan’ to southern secessionism (D. H. Johnson 2013). Similarly, the nationalisation
project of the GoS and the decimation of native administration in the peripheries
cannot been fully understood without an appreciation of the power of the Islamist
lobby within the traditional political parties – especially Hassan Al Turabi’s branch of
the National Islamic Front (Berridge 2017).
While a networked relational approach encourages the analytical distinction of actors
and ideologies in order to resist their conflation, it does not, at the same time, ignore their
interdependence. In practical terms, a comprehensive networked relational analysis
should ideally take a two-track approach whereby actors are foregrounded first, and
then ideologies or vice versa. In each half of the analysis, analysis of the latter should
appear in service of the former. Alternatively, analysts could boundary their study by
choosing to undertake either an investigation into actor relationality or ideological rela-
tionality. Either way, maintaining an inherently recursive perspective within a networked
relational analysis enables a systematic analysis of actors and ideologies by paying respect
to their interdependence yet avoiding their fusion.
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Hinterlands
Networked relationality is also adept to promote a politico-historical view of social
systems. This prevents certain aspects of actor or ideological relationality being misat-
tributed to peacebuilding when, in fact, they have their roots in other extra-peacebuild-
ing encounters. In bringing this to light, White et al. (2007) have shifted the analytical
focus away from networks alone toward sociocultural units which are termed
“network-domains,” or “netdoms”. To expand, using Krieger and Belliger (2014, 21),
‘The individual actors who participate in the network […] are themselves networks
that have at any certain time been more or less ‘black-boxed’ into function roles […]
They are what they are and can do what they can do because of the chain of associ-
ations in which they are “enrolled” and which constitutes the network’. In a concrete
example, Castells (2010, 7) explains ‘Roles (for example, to be a worker, a mother, a
neighbour, a socialist militant, a union member, a basketball player, a churchgoer,
and a smoker, at the same time) are defined by norms structured by the institutions
and organisations of society’. Therefore, a peacebuilding network is itself comprised col-
lectively by the historically constituted parameters produced during wider and prior,
encounters.
Applied to peacebuilding, netdoms – or as named here; ‘hinterlands’ – refer to the
relevant institutions and norms existing outside of the peacebuilding space but which
are nevertheless informing and mediating how peacebuilding is structured. A hypothe-
tical hybrid relational analysis might be drawn to analyse the 2019 uprising in Sudan
from a perspective narrowly zoomed-in on the peacebuilding space. Many of the
slogans of the uprising were soundbites lifted from classical liberalism: chants of
‘H urriyya, salām wa ‘adāla. As-sawra xiyār aš-ša‘b / Freedom, peace, and justice: The
revolution is the choice of the people’ reverberated around city centres where protes-
tors gathered. They called for the ‘Madaniyya / civil rule’ and the abolition of Shari’a
law (Casciarri and Manfredi 2020, 22, 36). In seeking to explain this, a hybrid analysis
might be drawn towards attributing this to European NGO’s peacebuilding education
programmes rolled out to implement the CPA. Programmes such as the British Coun-
cil’s ‘Active Citizens’ and The Dutch ‘Free Press Unlimited’ promoted the Sudanese to
hold their state accountable in the model of liberal democracies (Assal 2016).
However, a networked relational analysis, encourages a contextualisation of peace-
building with encounters outside of the peacebuilding space. There are many reasons
why this language came to the foreground of the protesters’ agenda. One of them is
that the group orchestrating the protests, the Sudanese Professionals Association, had
grown out of the trade union movement which spearheaded the decolonial struggle
against the British in the 1940s and 50s. Much of this professional class attended European
Universities on post-colonial scholarship schemes and returned to Sudan during Nimeiri’s
budding socialism. Debates about social contracts, freedom, civil rule and such like were
not only imported by peacebuilders in the wake of the CPA, but were already part of an
autonomous Europhile professional class and an autonomously globally-connected
youth. In addition, the slogans are in direct dialogue with those used in revolutions in
Egypt and Tunisia – they might be linguistically identifiable as liberal but their conceptual
journeys are not Western in origin (Casciarri and Manfredi 2020, 22). So-called ‘liberal’
ideologies of the uprising in 2019, or at least their language, were not a result of
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hybridisation during post-CPA peacebuilding interventions but had their roots in much
older and broader networked encounters.
As such, the analysis of interdependent peacebuilding networks of actors and ideol-
ogies must be taken in concert with the hinterland of macronetworks which inform
their composition. These broader networks show that liberal democratic claims made
by some groups have a long locally embedded history and have not simply been
imposed by external actors during CPA peacebuilding. This way, the ground is paved
for a subsequent normative analysis of how these ideological clashes should be addressed
in the post-conflict context. Under a networked relational analysis, policies directed at
supporting Sudan to secure sustainable peace in its new era will be informed by a rich
and historicised understanding of ideological clashes between the Sudanese Pro-
fessionals Association and the Islamist military.
Conclusions, limitations and ways forward
This article has examined the use of hybridity as the key critical lens for analysing inter-
actions between actors and ideologies in peacebuilding scholarship. While acknowledging
the distance travelled since the mission civilisatrice critique of peace interventions, I have
agreed with observers that analytical hybridity is somewhat held back by its foundational
concept: hybridity as conceptualised by Bhabha. I have agreed with suggestions that rela-
tional thinking can be used to bolster hybrid peace analysis but that it is a necessary but
insufficient supplement. I argued that networked thinking can offer a fuller picture.
To this end, I have outlined the three contributions of a networked relational approach
as a) the analytical separation of actors and ideologies b) the analytical focalisation on
situatedness and circularity of both actor characteristics and ideological dominance c)
the analytical inclusion of the broader and prior encounters which have composed the
peacebuilding structure. Sudanese peacebuilding in the wake of the CPA has been
used to animate this framework. I have shown how an analytical framework informed
by networked relationality can start chains of enquiries which end up informing policy
interventions in service of sustainable peace. In this way, the article has proposed a frame-
work in which the network is offered up as one possible extension of hybrid relationality.
A note on limitations and impetus for further research: I recognise that networked rela-
tionality is not a panacea which will remedy all difficulties associated with analysing
peacebuilding spaces. Indeed, at first glance it may appear to be unmanageably cumber-
some and unpragmatic. It may also seem bombastic; as though it is offering a ‘theory of
everything’ approach. The best way to assess this proposal is to see it in the context of
critiques of analytical hybridity in peace studies and especially against a background of
the current rise in relational thinking as a complement to hybridity. It should not be
viewed as a critique of all forms of analysis of peacebuilding spaces, nor even as a critique
of all uses of hybridity in peace studies. Specifically, the main purpose of networked rela-
tionality is to offer a supplementary concept to analytical hybridity which is the dominant
framework for enquiries into interactions between actors and ideologies during peace-
building. For research questions which might have identified hybridity as an appropriate
analytical guide – specifically, those interested in the coalescence of multiple peacebuild-
ing actors and ideologies – networked relationality can be seen as one possible comp-
lement to analytical hybridity.
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I do not claim its suitability for all research questions related to peacebuilding analysis:
there are many studies which analyse interactions from, for example, political economy
perspectives. Intersectional feminism has also been deployed in several innovative
studies of power (Al-Ali and Tas 2017; Martin de Almagro 2018; McLeod 2015). Also,
numerous studies which assess the impact on peace of individual peace initiatives such
as security sector reform or transitional justice. I do not intend that networked relational-
ity encroaches on their space. Furthermore, the descriptive and normative applications of
hybridity in peace studies, as explained at the start of the article, are not being contested.
Instead, I demarcate the scope of this networked relational approach as having similar
confines to analytical hybridity: specifically, it questions about interactions between
actors and ideologies during peacebuilding.
This framework has been sketched rather than fully demonstrated here. It can be seen
to promote a direction of travel which guards hybrid analysis against its most common
and enduring critiques. It is only through its application in full case studies that a net-
worked relational approach to peacebuilding analysis can be developed and refined.
Therefore, I present the framework as a gesture towards, and invitation for, further theor-
etical and applied study.
Notes
1. While other analytical lenses exist – see, for example, complexity frameworks (Brusset, De
Coning, and Hughes 2016; Millar 2016) – the dominance of hybridity is reflected by its
recent up-take in international peacebuilding practice. There has been a ‘transition from
liberal to hybrid peacebuilding in the documentation of international organisations involved
in peacebuilding, including the EU, UNDP, World Bank and OECD’ (Wallis and Richmond 2017,
424).
2. It should also be mentioned that scholarship in this area recognises that attempts to hybri-
dise, while made with sincere intentions to empower locals, can also have a ‘dark side’ and
produce unwanted deleterious effects (Simangan 2018; Wallis, Jeffery, and Kent 2016).
3. When I refer to hybridity as a theory, or foundational concept and not as an analytical frame-
work, I am referring to it in its original form as a critical theory and before its application to
peace studies.
4. Relational thinking is not new to peacebuilding. It was put forward by Morray and Liang
(2005), Chadwick, Debiel, and Gadinger (2013), Schluter and Ives (2018) in practice and
policy-oriented literature to recommend a focus on the relationships between actors – and
not the actors as entities in and of themselves. This fairly literal engagement with relationality
has been theoretically revitalised, in particular by Brigg (2018) and Joseph (2018) who have
re-embedded it within its rich ontological tradition.
5. Although it must be noted that many scholars have criticised hybridity as unradical in its
decoloniality since its ultimate aim is to argue for the necessity of peacebuilding intervention.
As Bargués-Pedreny and Randazzo (2018) argue, hybridity has primarily been deployed to cri-
tique the international but to ultimately encourage intervention.
6. There is a broader background debate in philosophy of social science between positivists,
post-positivists and critical realists which need not take up space here. But, briefly, my oppo-
sition to crypto-normativity does not come from a naïve positivist position but from within
critical realism where it is accepted that all research is value-laden while, at the same time,
epistemological relativism is resisted.
7. A pun on the Kantian ‘categorial imperative’, rather than its conceptual opposite, the ‘anti-
categorial imperative’ is intended to guard against essentialisation, in the same way Brigg
(2018) has identified.
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